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Summary  
This paper replicates the Johnson et al.’s (1998) empirical analysis of the affects of regulatory 
discretion on the unofficial economy. The narrow replication uses the data set of the original 
study which comprises of 49 countries for the year 1997. The wide replication is performed in 
two ways. Firstly, I investigate the original authors’ results using a larger data set of 162 
countries and for a period from 1999 to 2007. Secondly, I use Arellano and Bond estimator to 
investigate the dynamics and causal effects.  In both types of replications the results are similar 
to those in the original study. However, the estimates using Arellano and Bond estimator exhibit 
autocorrelation of order greater than 1 in the error term and are unable to pass the overidentifying 
restrictions test.    
Keywords: Unofficial or Shadow economy, Corruption, Replication, Regulation, Arellano and 
Bond estimator, Panel Data.  
JEL classification: D73 · H26 · O17 · O50 
 1. Introduction 
Johnson, Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobatόn (1998) (hereafter JKZ) tested three predictions of the 
theoretical model of Johnson, Kaufmann, and Andrei (1997). First, that greater regulation of 
economic activity leads to greater unofficial economy. Second, a higher tax burden, as perceived 
by economic agents, turned them away from the official sector.  Third, that corruption 
complements the unofficial activity.  Their findings, although supportive, were based on small 
sample (their full sample comprises of 49 countries which reduces to as low as 34 observations 
in some specifications). Moreover, it lacks coverage of East Asia and Africa, two biggest regions 
in terms of population and number of countries.  This makes it difficult to tease out general 
conclusions from their analysis.  
This paper replicates the analysis of JKZ both in narrow and wide sense. In wide replication, it 
employs a larger data set of 160 countries (country coverage varies from 119 to 160 countries in 
different estimations depending on the availability of right hand side variables). The wide 
replication not only tests the original relationship on a larger sample of countries (160 in total) 
but also for a different period (1999 to 2007). Unlike the original study, this study uses panel 
data set and also investigates the causal link between regulation and unofficial economy. The 
replication results are similar to the original analysis. However, the results from causality 
analysis are inconclusive.  
The rest of the paper is divided as follows. The second section describes the data and 
methodology. Third and fourth sections detail the results of replication and causality analysis 
respectively, while the fifth section concludes.  
2. Data and Methodology 
Following the original study, I have estimated the following empirical relation:  
Unofficialit = α + β[Regulatory Discretion]it + γ[Control]it + εit , 
Where, Unofficialit denotes size of the unofficial sector as a percent of GDP for country i in the 
year t,   α denotes the constant, and β is the coefficient, ε is the composite error term with usual 
assumptions. The Regulatory Discretion is captured in three different ways: (a) through different 
measures of the business regulation; (b) by using different measures of tax burden; and (c) by the 
indices of the rule of law and corruption. Each of these variables is used in turn to estimate the 
above equation controlling for the per capita GDP.    
The data for the unofficial economy is from Schneider et al. (2010). They provide the largest 
available panel data set on unofficial economic activities, covering 162 countries from 1999 to 
2007. They estimate the size of the shadow economy relative to the official GDP using the 
DYMIMIC (dynamic multiple causes, multiple indicators) method
1
. For other explanatory 
variable, I have relied on various sources, attempting most of the time to come as close as 
possible to the measures considered in the original study
2
.  
3. Results
3
  
Tables 1 (a and b) reproduce the results of JKZ using their data set
4
. The explanatory variables 
include Regulation1 (which is Heritage Foundation’s business freedom index), Regulation2 
(which is World Economic Forum’s measure of regulatory discretion); Regulation3 (which is 
Political Risk Services Group’s (PRSG) measure of bureaucratic quality); Regulation4 (which is 
Heritage Foundation’s measure of overall economic freedom); Taxation1(which is World 
Economic Forum’s (WEF) measure of tax burden); Taxation2 (which is Fraser institute’s 
measure of marginal income tax rate); Leg Env1 (which is PRSG’s measure of law and order); 
Leg Env2 (which is Heritage Foundation’s measure of property rights); Leg Env3 (which is 
Fraser Institute’s measure of equality of citizens before the law); Leg Env4 (which is World 
Governance Indicator’s measure of the rule of law); Corruption1 (which is transparency 
international’s index of corruption); Corruption2 (which is WEF’s measure of bribes in the 
public sector); Corruption3 (which is Impulse’s exporter bribery index); Corruption4 (which is 
                                                     
1
 DYMIMIC method infers the size of the shadow economy from variables such as direct and indirect taxation, 
custom duties, government regulations, the rate of unemployment, growth rate of real GDP, and currency 
circulation. In order to calibrate absolute figures of the size of the shadow economies from the relative DYMIMIC 
estimation results, they used previous estimates derived using the currency demand method. 
2
 Details of the data sources and definitions of the variables are given in Table A.  
3
 All estimations use STATA version 11.  
4
 The data set is available at 
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:20701021~pagePK:
64214825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.html 
WGI’s index of control of corruption); Corruption5 (which is PRSG’s measure of public sector 
corruption). 
 The results tell us that more restrictive regulations from business point of view, increase the size 
of the shadow economy; greater tax burden is unsustainable with larger size of shadow economy; 
more effective law and order implementation helps attract economic activity in official sector; 
and public sector corruption has a negative affect on business decisions and positive on the size 
of the unofficial sector. These tables mimic the results of Tables 1 and 2 in JKZ study.  
The results of wide replication, which uses panel data, are shown in tables 2 (a and b) and 3 (a 
and b). Following the recommendation of Beck and Katz (1995) we reported panel corrected 
standard errors which are robust against heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation
5
.  In table 2a, I 
have used two measures of regulation (Regulation3 and Regulation5). The Regulation3 is similar 
to JKZ whereas Regulation5 is a new measure.  My results, like those of JKZ, indicate a negative 
relation between the quality of governance and the size of the unofficial economy (columns 2a.1 
and 2a.2). In the next two columns (2a.3 and 2a.4) I have used two measures of taxation 
(Taxation2 and Taxation3). The Taxation2 is similar to JKZ whereas Taxation3 is a new 
measure. The coefficients on these measures of taxation are positive and significant indicating, 
as in JKZ, that larger size of the shadow economy is not sustainable with lower tax rates. 
In table 2b, I have presented the results of the affect of legal environment (Leg Env1 and Leg 
Env2) on the unofficial economy using two measures of legal environment. The first measure 
(Leg Env1) is similar to JKZ measure of law and order.  Results indicate negative and significant 
impact of good legal environment on the unofficial economy (columns 2b.1 and 2b.2).  
In table 2b columns (2b.3 and 2b.4), I have employed two measures of corruption (Corruption1 
and Corruption2). Higher values of these indices are associated with lower corruption. Our 
results indicate that lower the corruption, lower the size of the unofficial economy.  
                                                     
5
 We do not use individual specific fixed effects because there is not enough within variation in the variables of our 
sample, in particular the size of the shadow economy.  
4. Causality Analysis 
As an extension of the analysis of the JKZ, I try to identify the causal impact of the regulatory 
discretion on the shadow economy. Given the difficulties in finding the instruments for all the 
three sets of our variables, I use Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator which uses the own past 
values of the endogenous regressors as instruments.  
Tables 3(a and b) show the results. The two crucial assumptions of Arellano and Bond estimator 
are  the absence of serial correlation in the error term beyond order 1 and the validity of the 
overidentifying restrictions. The bottom panel of the table provides test hypothesis on these two 
assumptions.  As is clear from the table, in most of the cases there exists serial correlation 
beyond order one. While Sargan test clearly indicates that overidentyfying restrictions are not 
valid. Although the coefficients of our regressions are in line with the earlier findings but failure 
to satisfy the assumptions of the Arellano and Bond estimator do not permit a valid inference
6
.  
Conclusions 
I have replicated and reinvestigated the relationship between regulatory discretion and the size of 
the unofficial economy. In this respect, the paper endorses the findings of JKZ and adds two 
important dimensions to their results. First, it produces the same results using a much larger data 
set than original authors thus filling the important gap in terms of country coverage. Secondly, 
the paper attempts to establish a causal connection between the relationships proposed by 
original authors. The results of the causal analysis using Arellano and Bond estimator suffer 
from weak instrument and serial correlation problems. A more rigorous causal analysis could be 
an important motivation for future research in this area.   
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Table A. Data Description  
 JKZ Data ( for the year 1997) Panel Data (for 1999-2007) 
Code  Description 
Regulation1 Business Freedom Heritage: It is a measure of the ability to start, operate, and 
close a business that represents the overall burden of regulation as well as the 
efficiency of government in the regulatory process. High scores indicate freer 
business environment. Source. Heritage Foundation’s Economic Freedom Index. 
   
Regulation2 Regulatory discretion:  
World Economic Forum’s (WEF) 
measure of regulatory discretion. 
Higher values indicate lesser 
regulatory discretion. Source 
Johnson et al. (1998) data.  
 
Regulation5  Regulation Quality:  
It captures perceptions of the ability of the 
government to formulate and implement 
sound policies and regulations that permit 
and promote private sector development. 
Source World Governance Indicators. 
Regulation3 Bureaucratic quality: A measure of institutional strength and quality of the 
bureaucracy. High points are given to countries where the bureaucracy has the 
strength and expertise to govern without drastic changes in policy or interruptions 
in government services. Source International Country Risk Guide Services and 
The Political Risk Services Group 
Regulation4 Economic Freedom: It is a measure of the ability to start, operate, and close a 
business that represents the overall burden of regulation as well as the efficiency 
of government in the regulatory process. High scores indicate freer business 
environment. Source. Heritage Foundation’s Economic Freedom Index. 
Taxation1 Tax burden: WEF’s measure of tax 
burden. A higher value means lesser 
burden. Source. Johnson et al. (1998) 
data.  
   
 
Taxation2 Marginal Income Tax Rate: Fraser institute’s measure of marginal income tax 
rate. It assigns lower ratings to countries with higher tax rates at lower income 
brackets.  
Taxation3  Fiscal Freedom Heritage: It measures tax 
burden imposed by the government. It 
includes both the direct tax burden in 
terms of top tax rates on individual and 
corporate incomes and the overall amount 
of tax revenue as a percentage of GDP. 
Source.  Heritage Foundation, 
www.heritage.org/index/about 
Leg Env1 Law and Order:  It is a measure of two components ‘law’ and ‘order’. The law 
subcomponent is an assessment of the strength and impartiality of the legal 
system, while the order subcomponent is an assessment of popular observance of 
the law. Higher values indicate greater law and order effectiveness. Source. 
International Counry Risk Guide Services and The Political Risk Services Group.     
www.prsgroup.com  
Leg Env2 Property Rights: It is an assessment of the ability of individuals to accumulate 
private property, secured by clear laws that are fully forces by the state. Source.  
Heritage Foundation, www.heritage.org/index/about 
   
Leg Env3 Equality of citizens before the law: 
Fraser institute’s measure of civil 
liberties and political rights. Higher 
scores indicate greater rights and 
liberties. Source. Johnson et al. 
(1998).
 
 
Leg Env4  Rule of Law: It captures the perception of 
the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of 
society, and in particular the quality of 
contract enforcement, property rights, the 
police, and the courts, as well as the 
likelihood of crime and violence. Source 
World Governance Indicators, World 
Bank 
Corruption1 Transparency international’s index 
for corruption perceptions. Higher 
values indicate lesser corruption. 
 
Source. Johnson et al. (1998). 
   
Corruption2 Bribery Index: World Economic 
Forum’s survey based measure of 
bribes in public sector. Higher scores 
correspond lower corruption. Source. 
Johnson et al. (1998). 
 
   
Corruption3 Impulse's exporter bribery index: 
Incidence of bribery in public sector 
in foreign country as reported by 
German traders and investors abroad. 
Source. Johnson et al. (1998). 
 
Corruption4  Corruption Control: It captures 
perceptions of the extent to which public 
power is exercised for private gain, 
including both petty and grand forms of 
corruption, as well as “capture” of state by 
the elites and private interests. Source. 
World Governance Indicators, World 
Bank. 
Corruption5  Corruption ICRG: It is an assessment of 
the corruption within the political system. 
Higher values indicate lower corruption. 
Source. International Country Risk Guide 
Services and The Political Risk Services 
Group. www.prsgroup.com 
 
Table 1a. Unofficial economy, regulation, and taxation (JKZ data) 
Independent Var. 1a.1 1a.2 1a.3 1a.4 1a.5 1a.6 
       
Regulation1
b 
8.060***      
 (2.057)      
Regulation2
a 
 -2.913     
  (2.941)     
Regulation3
a 
  -7.728***    
   (2.459)    
Regulation4
a 
   -0.363   
    (0.884)   
Taxation1
a 
    -6.485***  
     (1.887)  
Taxation2
a 
     1.901*** 
      (0.686) 
       
GDP pc log -7.273*** -7.425** -1.040 -7.421*** -7.304*** -6.987*** 
 (1.162) (3.137) (2.942) (2.737) (1.537) (1.320) 
       
Observations 47 34 39 43 34 42 
R-square 0.615 0.598 0.654 0.440 0.680 0.572 
 Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 
a
 A higher value of this variable 
means better outcome for private business; 
b
 A higher value of this variable means worse outcome for 
private business. Constant is included but not reported 
Table 1b. Unofficial economy, legal environment, and corruption (JKZ data) 
Independent Var. 1b.1 1b.2 1b.3 1b.4 1b.5 1b.6 
       
Leg Env1
a 
-9.307***      
 (2.385)      
Leg Env2
b 
 8.023**     
  (3.527)     
Leg Env3
a 
  -2.328***    
   (0.656)    
 
      
Corruption1
a 
   -3.482***   
    (1.061)   
Corruption2
a 
    -3.881*  
     (2.197)  
Corruption3
b 
     0.828* 
      (0.451) 
GDP pc log -1.850 -4.785* -5.227*** -3.999* -5.807* -6.464*** 
 (2.031) (2.378) (1.583) (1.997) (3.262) (2.122) 
       
Observations 39 47 43 43 34 44 
R-square 0.781 0.584 0.603 0.605 0.627 0.512 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; a A higher value of this variable means better outcome for 
private business; b A higher value of this variable means worse outcome for private business. Constant is included but not 
reported. 
Table 2a. Unofficial economy, regulation, and taxation; (Panel data 1999-2007) 
Independent Var. 2a.1 2a.2 2a.3 2a.4 
     
Regulation3 -5.375***    
 (0.211)    
Regulation5  -4.046***   
  (0.258)   
Taxation2   0.967***  
   (0.040)  
Taxation3    0.172*** 
    (0.013) 
     
GDP pc log -2.831*** -3.695*** -7.228*** -6.232*** 
 (0.180) (0.176) (0.108) (0.057) 
     
Observations 1160 1083 862 1291 
No. of countries 132 158 118 150 
R-square 0.503 0.446 0.467 0.445 
χ
2
 (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Panel Corrected Standard Errors in parenthesis; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1;  
Constant is included but not reported. 
Table 2b. Unofficial economy, legal environment, and corruption;(Panel data 1999-2007) 
Independent Var. 2b.5 2b.6 2b.7 2b.8 
     
Legal Env1 -3.399***    
 (0.222)    
Legal Env4  -7.103***   
  (0.251)   
Corruption4   -6.051***  
   (0.262)  
Corruption5    -2.832*** 
    (0.359) 
GDP pc log -4.253*** -1.888*** -2.500*** -4.992*** 
 (0.162) (0.167) (0.163) (0.211) 
     
Observations 1160 1083 1083 1160 
No. of countries 132 158 158 132 
R-square 0.498 0.531 0.514 0.469 
χ
2
 (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Panel Corrected Standard Errors in parenthesis; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1;  
Constant is included but not reported. 
Table 3a. Unofficial Economy, regulation, and taxation.  
Arellano and Bond Estimator (panel data 1999-2007) 
Independent Var. (3a.1) (3a.2) (3a.3) (3a.4) 
     
Lag unoff eco 0.804*** 0.458*** 0.655*** 0.669*** 
 (0.088) (0.102) (0.090) (0.104) 
     
GDP pc log -2.451*** -4.430*** -3.323*** -3.061*** 
 (0.514) (0.560) (0.539) (0.601) 
     
Regulation3 -0.508***    
 (0.137)    
Regulation5  -0.379***   
  (0.142)   
Taxation2   0.024  
   (0.017)  
Taxation3    0.007** 
    (0.003) 
     
Observations 901 768 743 994 
No. of countries 132 158 117 149 
Arellano-Bond Test of 0.001 0.290 0.002 0.001 
AR(2) p-value 0.040 0.720 0.285 0.042 
Sargan test (p-value) 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.000 
No. of instruments 28 19 25 28 
Robust standard errors in parentheses;*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1;  
Constant is included but not reported.  
 
Table 3b. Unofficial Economy, legal environment, and corruption. 
Arrelano and Bond Estimator (panel data 1999-2007) 
Independent Var. (3b.1) (3b.2) (3b.3) (3b.4) 
     
Lag Unofficial Eco. 0.871*** 0.493*** 0.783*** 0.482*** 
 (0.093) (0.104) (0.108) (0.102) 
     
GDP pc log -2.097*** -4.216*** -2.686*** -4.317*** 
 (0.546) (0.583) (0.664) (0.576) 
     
Legal Env1 -0.230**    
 (0.111)    
Legal Env4  -0.534***   
  (0.196)   
Corruption5   -0.128*  
   (0.066)  
Corruption4    -0.295*** 
    (0.105) 
     
Observations 901 768 901 768 
No. of countries 132 158 132 158 
Arellano-Bond Test of 0.001 0.190 0.000 0.202 
AR(2) p-value 0.028 0.605 0.042 0.589 
Sargan test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
No. of instruments 28 19 28 19 
Robust standard errors in parentheses;*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1;  
Constant is included but not reported.  
 
 
 
